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A Deregulatory Framework for
Alleviating Concentrated
African-American Poverty
BENJAMIN ZIMMER

Introduction
In 1967, Norman Rockwell released the painting New Kids in the
Neighborhood,which depicts an African-American family moving to a
white suburb. The painting focuses on the interaction of the family's
children with three white children in the driveway of their new
home. The children eye each other with trepidation, but their faces
convey more curiosity than suspicion, and other than their race they
seem to have more commonalities than differences.' The painting
suggests a new era for residential equality in the United States.
Previously, the middle-class suburbs, the iconic symbol of the
American dream, had been available only to white Americans.
African Americans, in contrast, had been largely confined to
impoverished inner-city slums. Henceforth, Rockwell seemed to
envision, a more equitable future lay ahead.
Rockwell's painting was emblematic of a broader spirit of
cautious optimism towards residential inequality and racial
desegregation in the United States at the time. Three years earlier
President Lyndon Johnson had declared an "unconditional war on
poverty." "Many Americans live on the outskirts of hope," he
declared, "some because of their poverty, and some because of their
color, and all too many because of both." "We must ... seek," he
continued, "as our ultimate goal in our free enterprise system a
decent home for every American family." 2 Subsequently, Johnson
1. See Norman Rockwell, New Kids in the Neighborhood (1967), in NORMAN
ROCKWELL: PICTURES FOR THE AMERICAN PEOPLE 13, available at http://www.nrm.

org/pdfs/family-guide.pdf.
2. See Lyndon B. Johnson, Annual Message to Congress on the State of the Union
(Jan. 8, 1964), available at http://www.lbjlib.utexas.edu/johnson/archives.hom/
speeches.hom/640108.asp.
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pushed through Congress several pieces of legislation designed to
Most notably for purposes of
combat racism and poverty.
residential equality, the Fair Housing Act of 1968 outlawed all
discrimination in the sale, rental, and financing of housing. "[Flair
housing for all -

all human beings who live in this country -

is

now a part of the American way of life," Johnson declared at the
bill's signing. "In the [Fair Housing] Act of 1968 America does move
forward and the bell of freedom rings out a little louder." 3
More than forty years later, however, the promise of Rockwell's
painting and Johnson's rhetoric remain unrealized. On the contrary,
America's urban poor have only become more geographically
concentrated and isolated since the late 1960s. 4 And African
Americans continue to comprise the majority of impoverished-inner
city residents.5 Some degree of both socioeconomic and racial
3. See Lyndon B. Johnson, Remarks Upon Signing the Civil Rights Act (April 11,
1968), available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=28799&st
=Housing&stl=Fair.

4. In 1970, 12% of poor Americans lived in high poverty non-rural neighborhoods
(defined as a metropolitan census tract with a poverty rate of 40% or higher). PAUL A.
JARGOWSKY, POVERTY AND PLACE: GHETTOS, BARRIOS, AND THE AMERICAN CITY 9-12, 30
(1997). [Hereinafter JARGOWSKY, POVERTY AND PLACE]. By 1990, that number had risen to
18%. Id. at 30. The tech bubble of the 1990s reduced this figure slightly by lowering
overall poverty levels (and thus the number of high-poverty neighborhoods). See THE
FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM & THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTE, THE ENDURING CHALLENGE OF
CONCENTRATED POVERTY IN AMERICA: CASE STUDIES FROM COMMUNITIES ACROSS THE
U.S. 7-8 (2008)." [Hereinafter BROOKINGS, ENDURING CHALLENGE]. But recent work
suggests that poverty concentration has increased once again during the 2000s. See
ELIZABETH KNEEBONE & ALAN BERUBE, BROOKINGS INSTITUTE, REVERSAL OF FORTUNE: A
NEW LOOK AT CONCENTRATED POVERTY IN THE 2000s (2008). Additionally, despite the
temporary reversal of the 1990s, even in 2000 poverty concentration remained higher
than in 1970. See BROOKINGS, ENDURING CHALLENGE, supra note 4; WILLIAM JULIUS
WILSON, MORE THAN JUST RACE: BEING BLACK AND POOR IN THE INNER CITY 59 (2009)
(drop in concentrated poverty during the 1990s was a "blip[] of [an] economic boom[]
rather than [a] permanent trend"). It is also worth noting that while one in five poor
Americans living in high poverty neighborhoods may not seem overly concentrated,
high poverty census tracts account for fewer than 5% of all metropolitan neighborhoods.
Thus, even if most poor people do not live in high poverty neighborhoods, the urban
poor are highly concentrated. See JARGOWSKY, POVERTY & PLACE, supra note 4, at 10.

Additionally, the total U.S. poverty rate over the past few decades has been around 1015%. Id. at 42. Thus, the mere existence of these high poverty neighborhoods reveals a
major concentration of urban poverty.
5. As of 1990, African Americans comprised at least two-thirds of the residents in
approximately half of all high-poverty neighborhoods. In half of those (a quarter of the
total), African Americans comprised more than 90% of residents. Additionally, African
Americans comprised fewer than 10% of residents in only 20% of high-poverty

neighborhoods, meaning (since African Americans account for slightly more than 10% of
the national population) that they were overrepresented in nearly 80%. See JARGOWSKY,
POVERTY & PLACE, supra note 4, at 15-16. As African Americans disproportionately suffer
from concentrated poverty they disproportionately benefited from its temporary
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segregation is natural, as many people prefer to live near others with
similar demographic characteristics. But, as this paper will discuss,
the ongoing concentration of impoverished African Americans in
inner-city slums is neither naturally occurring nor benign. Rather, it
is the consequence of historical racial discrimination combined with
a set of ongoing policies that reinforce the detrimental consequences
of that discrimination. 6 Moreover, due partially to some of the same
government policies, residents of impoverished inner-city
neighborhoods face structural impediments to upward mobility
beyond those associated with simply being poor. 7 The perpetuation
of concentrated African-American poverty, then, is a problem that
transcends both its racial and economic sub-components. It involves
systematic government-imposed economic disadvantages that not
only disproportionately impact members of a single race, but do so
in a manner directly attributable to past policies of de jure
segregation.
The perpetuation of concentrated African-American poverty is
not a consequence of any lack of effort to combat it. On the contrary,
since the late 1960s the government has enacted countless programs
to combat concentrated poverty and residential segregation. Why
these policies have failed to alleviate the concentration of
impoverished African Americans in inner city slums, and what the
government must do differently going forward, is the subject of this
article.
The article's central theme is that a tragic irony underlies our
country's forty-year failure to alleviate concentrated AfricanAmerican poverty. Efforts to combat concentrated poverty have
consisted primarily of new government interventions in the housing
market: subsidies, mandates, and other programs and regulations
designed to compel socioeconomic and/or racial integration. All the
while, a separate set of government interventions in the form of tax
expenditures, education financing, and land-use controls are largely
responsible for the perpetuation of concentrated African-American
poverty in the first place. With these policies firmly in place,
reduction during the 1990s. See PAUL A. JARGOWSKY, BROOKINGS INSTITUTE, STUNNING
PROGRESS, HIDDEN PROBLEMS: THE DRAMATIC DECLINE OF CONCENTRATED POVERTY IN

THE 1990s 5, 8-10 (2003); WILSON, supra note 4, at 59. But there is no reason to believe

they did not accordingly suffer disproportionally from re-concentration during the 2000s.
Indeed, initial analysis of 2010 census data suggests that racial segregation in American
cities remains "alive and well." See Craig Gurian, New Maps Show Segregation Alive and
Well, REMAPPING DEBATE (April 20, 2011), http://www.remappingdebate.org/mapdata-tool/new-maps-show-segregation-alive-and-well.
6. See Part II, infra.
7. See Part III, infra.
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supplemental interventions have been at best ineffective and all too
frequently actively harmful. A successful approach to poverty deconcentration and residential integration must begin by eliminating
harmful government interventions in the housing market, not by
adding even more interventions on top of them.
At the same time, deregulating the housing market alone will
not be enough. The ongoing drivers of concentrated poverty may be
racially neutral tax, education, and land use regulations. But the
concentrated African-American poverty these regulations entrenched was a result of explicit racial discrimination, not a meritocratic or
even random initial allocation of resources. Due to the perpetuation
of concentrated poverty, the deleterious effects of that racial
discrimination remain in effect. Even 40 years after de jure racial
segregation ended, African Americans continue to suffer from its
consequences. Thus, even as housing deregulation is a critical
prerequisite to alleviating concentrated African-American poverty,
certain strategic government interventions - particularly those
targeted at helping poor African Americans - may also be
necessary. This paper will seek to provide some insight on which
types of interventions might be valuable - and which are not.
This paper is hardly the first work to address concentrated
poverty or residential segregation. On the contrary, a multitude of
books, academic articles, and policy reports have discussed in detail
various aspects of both topics. Historians have discussed their initial
causes.8 Sociologists have written at length about segregation's
harmful consequences. 9 Economists and economically minded law
professors have discussed the sometimes counter-intuitively harmful
consequences of various government interventions in the housing
market. 10 Policy analysts at think-tanks and elsewhere have
provided detailed analyses of the impacts of particular government
programs, often at the level of a particular city or even a particular
housing development.1 1 And law professors have provided similar
8. See, e.g., DOUGLAS S. MASSEY & NANCY A. DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID:
SEGREGATION AND THE MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS (1993); CHARLES ABRAMS,
FORBIDDEN NEIGHBORS: A STUDY OF PREJUDICE IN HOUSING (1971).
9. See, e.g., WILSON, supra note 4; Robert J.Sampson, Patrick Sharkey, & Stepehen W.
Raudenbush, Durable Effects of ConcentratedDisadvantageon Verbal Ability Among AfricanAmerican Children, 105 PNAS 845 (2008) [Hereinafter Sampson et al., Durable Effects on
Verbal Ability].
10. See, e.g., EDWARD L. GLAESER & JOSEPH GYOURKO, RETHINKING FEDERAL
HOUSING POLICY: How TO MAKE HOUSING PLENTIFUL AND AFFORDABLE (2008); Robert
Ellickson, The False Promise of the Mixed-Income Housing Project, 57 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 983
(2010).
11. See, e.g., EDWARD G. GOETZ, CLEARING THE WAY: DECONCENTRATING THE POOR
IN URBAN AMERICA (2003); SUSAN

J. POPKIN ET AL.,

THE URBAN INSTITUTE: A DECADE OF
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analyses of the various pieces of litigation surrounding residential
segregation. 12
For such a complex and multi-faceted problem, detailed studies
of particular aspects can provide valuable sources of insight. The
problem with this approach, however, is that by siphoning off a
small piece of the problem, analysts may overlook the
interconnectedness of that piece to the whole. This is particularly
dangerous when analysts seek to generalize or extrapolate broader
conclusions from their narrow analysis.
For instance, historically and sociologically minded scholars and
policy analysts tend to focus on the widespread racial discrimination
that caused concentrated African-American poverty and the tragic
consequences of its perpetuation. Unsurprisingly, then, they tend to
urge solutions that involve government interventions targeted at
helping these suffering individuals.13 However, due to the limited
scope of their work, they frequently do not engage with the broader
economic context into which these interventions occur. Yet, as this
paper will discuss, this context renders some of their proposed
interventions are unnecessary, others marginally beneficial but
ultimately non-impactful, and others actively detrimental.
Economically minded scholars and policy analysts, for their
part, tend to focus on the pernicious effects of many of the
government regulations related to urban policy, including many
intended to help impoverished African Americans. However, they
tend to examine these policies outside the lens of concentrated
African-American poverty, focusing rather on efficiency and
affordability in the housing market more generally. 14 They therefore
government
urge lifting certain unhelpful
appropriately
interventions; but they may underestimate the full set of challenges
facing the creation of equitable urban living arrangements.1 5
HOPE VI: RESEARCH FINDINGS AND POLICY CHALLENGES (2004); Paul C. Brophy, MixedIncome Housing: Factors for Success, 3 CITYSCAPE: A JOURNAL OF POLICY DEVELOPMENT
AND RESEARCH 1 (1997); Neil Kraus, Local Policymaking and ConcentratedPoverty: The Case
of Buffalo, New York, 21 CITIES 481 (2004).

12. See, e.g., Peter H. Schuck, Judging Remedies: Judicial Approaches to Housing
Segregation, 37 HARV. C. R.-C. L.L. REV. 289 (2002).
13. See, e.g., MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 8, at 229 ("Dismantling the ghetto ...

requires direct institutional
unprecedented degree.").

involvement

of the federal government[]

[t]o

an

14. See, e.g., GLAESER & GYOURKO, supra note 10.

15. For instance, Randall Holcombe and Benjamin Powell argue that "[1l]ooking at
the big picture, America's housing market is not facing a crisis [because] [miost
Americans have more-than-adequate shelter." See Randall G. Holcombe & Benjamin
Powell, Introduction, in HOUSING AMERICA: BUILDING OUT OF A CRISIS (Randall G.

Holcombe & Benjamin Powell eds. 2009). As the remainder of this paper will argue, this
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Thus, for all that has been written on issues related to
concentrated African-American poverty, there is a dearth of holistic
analysis tying together all the pieces of the problem into coherent
policy recommendations. This paper will certainly not be the final
word on the causes, consequences, or appropriate solutions to
concentrated African-American poverty. But one of the paper's
useful contributions will be to approach these questions through a
different analytical framework than most of the existing literature.
Rather than look at any one piece of the topic in great detail, it will
seek to synthesize the multitude of existing analyses and case
studies into a more holistic understanding of concentrated AfricanAmerican poverty and all its various dimensions. It will, in a sense,
attempt to see the forest for the trees.
The article will conduct this analysis in four Sections. Section I
will discuss the causes of concentrated African-American poverty,
Section II will discuss why
both historically and presently.
concentrated African-American poverty is a problem worth caring
about and alleviating, in spite of recent attempts to minimize its
importance. Section III will provide an overview of the different
types of programs that are currently in place to combat the problem,
and will discuss why none has succeeded in substantially alleviating
it. Section IV will discuss several law and policy recommendations
for more effectively addressing the problem going forward.

I. Causes of Concentrated African-American Poverty
The concentration of urban poverty is as old as urbanization
itself. As early as the 1890s, English sociologist Charles Booth
demonstrated that the poor in London were concentrated in the
eastern parts of the city, while wealthier persons lived
predominately in the west.16 In the United States, photojournalist
Jacob Riis's 1890 book How the Other Half Lives famously
documented the congestion of the poor in New York's lower east
side tenement housing.17
Nevertheless, the concentrated poverty of late nineteenth and
early twentieth century America was of a decidedly different nature
from the predominantly African-American urban poverty of recent
decades. Inhabited largely by poor immigrants from Europe who
is an over simplistic understanding of housing policy. See infra Section III.D (discussing
the shortcomings of several economists' arguments that concentrated poverty is not a
serious a problem).
16. See CHARLES BOOTH, LIFE AND LABOUR OF THE PEOPLE IN LONDON (1902-1903).
17. See JACOB A. Rits, HOW THE OTHER HALF LIVES: STUDIES AMONG THE TENEMENTS
IN NEW YORK (1890).
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naturally lived together when first arriving in the country, these
poor neighborhoods were, in the words of Douglas Massey and
Nancy Denton, "a fleeting, transitory stage in the process of
immigrant assimilation." 18 Indeed, modern research "has done
much to discredit the conception of the [nineteenth and early
twentieth century] 'ghetto' as a neighborhood of permanence."19
In contrast, contemporary concentrated African-American
poverty is "a permanent feature of black residential life." Whereas
immigrant enclaves "served as springboards for broader mobility in
society," impoverished African-American neighborhoods serve as
impediments to their residents' geographic, economic, and social
mobility over the course of generations. 20 Why concentrated
African-American poverty has been uniquely intransient is the
subject of the rest of this Section. The explanation with which one
must undoubtedly start is explicit racial discrimination.
A. Racial Discrimination
Racial discrimination in the United States has existed for
centuries, but the particular problem of urban housing
discrimination is a relatively recent one. Prior to early 1900s, the
vast majority of African Americans lived in the rural south, and
those that did live in urban areas were relatively evenly dispersed
among neighborhoods. 21 African-American migration to northern
urban centers began in earnest only with the onset of World War I.
The war increased demand for urban industrial production while
simultaneously cutting off the flow of white European immigrants
who had previously provided the workforce for that production. 22
This opened new urban labor opportunities to African Americans in
manufacturing and other industrial work that had previously been
available to them only as strike breakers. 23 Over the next several
decades, rapid African American urbanization continued. All told,
between 1910 and 1950, the African-American urban population
increased nearly four-fold from approximately 2.5 million to more
than nine million.24
As African Americans arrived in cities, whites worked
18. MASSEY & DENTON, supranote 8, at 33.
19. CHARLES N. GLAAB & A. THEODORE BROWN, A HISTORY OF URBAN AMERICA 142-

3 (3d ed. 1983).
20. MASSEY & DENTON, supra n. 8, at 33.
21. See id. at 17-26; HENRY LOUIs TAYLOR, JR. & WALTER HILL, HISTORICAL ROOTS OF

THE URBAN CRISIS: AFRICAN AMERICANS IN THE INDUSTRIAL CITY 8 (2000).
22. MASSEY & DENTON, supra note. 8, at 28-9.
23. TAYLOR & HILL, supra note. 22, at 7.
24. Id. at 2.
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systematically to prevent them from moving into existing white
neighborhoods. At the local level, neighborhood "improvement
associations" (or other similarly named organizations) served as the
Intended
primary instrument for residential discrimination.
ostensibly to promote neighborhood security and enhance property
values, neighborhood associations in reality began as a thinly veiled
(if veiled at all) attempt to keep African-American migrants from
integrating. Most notably, neighborhood associations organized and
promoted race-restrictive covenants, in which property holders
mutually committed themselves to not sell or rent their property to a
non-Caucasian for a fixed period of time, sometimes indefinitely.
These requirements became part of property deeds and were passed
down to heirs and future owners. Neighborhood associations
promoted the spread of these covenants by drafting model
agreements, organizing signing drives, and using their influence
over local realtors and real estate boards to have them added to
property deeds at time of sale.25 By the mid-1940s, race-restrictive
covenants were in widespread use across the United States,
covering, for example, 5.5 square miles of land in St. Louis and
eleven square miles in Chicago. 26
Racial discrimination in housing was not limited to local
organizations. Beginning in the 1930s, the federal government began
to systematically promote housing discrimination and segregation
through the newly created Home Owners Loan Corporation
("HOLC") and Federal Housing Authority ("FHA"). Part of
Franklin Roosevelt's New Deal, the organizations were founded to
provide economic stimulus to the construction industry and help
Specifically, the HOLC
Americans avoid home foreclosures.
mortgages in danger of
for
refinancing
certain
urban
provided funds
default, while the FHA guaranteed private bank loans for
construction of certain new homes. In determining which houses to
fund, however, both agencies employed blatantly racist and
segregationist policies. The HOLC conducted risk assessments of
neighborhoods, and those with even a small portion of African
Americans received the lowest of four ratings, "hazardous." 27 The
FHA Underwriting Manual, for its part, specifically warned against
25. See ABRAMS, supra note 8, at 181-185; MASSEY & DENTON, supra note. 8, at 35-7;
CLEMENT E. VOSE, CAUCASIANS ONLY: THE SUPREME COURT, THE NAACP, AND THE
RESTRICTIVE COVENANT CASES 7-13 (1959); Michael Jones-Correa, The Origins and
Diffiusion of Racial Restrictive Covenants, 115 POL. SCI. Q. 541, 544, 563-7 (2000-2001).
26. VOSE, supra note 25, at 9.
27. See KENNETH T. JACKSON, CRABGRASS FRONTIER: THE SUBURBANIZATION OF THE
UNITED STATES 195-203 (1987); MASSEY & DENTON, supra note. 8, at 51-2; ABRAMS, supra
note 8, at 237-238.
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lending in areas with "inharmonious racial or nationality groups."
"If a neighborhood is to retain its stability," it directed, "it is
necessary that properties shall continue to be occupied by the same
social and racial classes." 28 The FHA also established minimum
requirements for lot size, house width, setback from the street, and
separation from adjacent structures, eliminating most categories of
non-suburban housing from its loan guarantees. 29
Taken together, these policies resulted in the famous "white
flight" to the suburbs of the 1940s and 1950s. Federal housing policy
spurred extensive construction of new housing, but only for
Caucasians, and only in the suburbs. In Philadelphia, for instance,
more than 700,000 whites moved to the city's suburbs during the
1950s, while the city lost 225,000 whites and gained 153,000 blacks.
During the same period, suburban Chicago gained more than
1 million whites while the city lost 399,000 whites and gained
320,000 blacks.3 0 Meanwhile, within cities, restrictive covenants and related tools
maintained a firm color line between neighborhoods. Even after the
Supreme Court declared the judicial enforcement of race restrictive
covenants unconstitutional in 1948,31 realtors continued to work
systematically to exclude blacks from white neighborhoods. 32
Moreover, since the majority of whites supported residential
segregation, judicial enforcement of restrictive covenants was rarely
necessary.33 And the Supreme Court's ruling certainly did not bring
about the end of racial discrimination in government residential
policy. In addition to the continued segregationist practices of the
federal housing agencies, city governments contributed where they
could. In Chicago, for instance, Mayor Richard J. Daley deliberately
relocated the Dan Ryan expressway to create a physical barrier
between white and black neighborhoods on the city's south side.34
28. JACKSON, supra note 27, at 208-215; MASSEY & DENTON, supra note. 8, at 534;
ABRAMS, supra note. 8, at 230-2.
29. JACKSON, supra note. 28, at 208.
30. See Thomas J. Surgue, The Unfinished History ofRacial Segregation (July 15, 2008),
http://wwwprrac.org/projects/fair-housingcomnission/chicago/sugrue.pdf.
31. See Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
32. MASSEY & DENTON, supra note. 8, at 49-50; see also Richard W. Brooks, Covenants
without Courts: Enforcing Residential Segregation with Legally Unenforceable Agreements
(2010) (on file with Author).
33. Brooks, supra note 32.
34. ADAM SETH COHEN & ELIZABETH JOEL TAYLOR, AMERICAN PHAROAH: MAYOR
RICHARD J. DALEY: His BATrLE FOR CHICAGO AND THE NATION 189 (2001). Many other

city governments similarly deliberately located expressways in places that would
promote racial segregation. See Raymond A. Mohl, Planned Destruction: The Interstates
and Central City Housing, in FROM TENEMENTS TO TAYLOR HOMES: IN SEARCH OF AN
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Nevertheless, by the late 1960s, explicit racial discrimination in
housing policy began to wane. Coming under increasing scrutiny
from civil rights advocates, including U.S. Senators, in 1966 the FHA
dramatically changed its lending practices so that they were no
longer openly discriminatory.3 5 The next year, the Supreme Court
held in Reitman v. Mulkey that any government policy that
"encouraged" housing discrimination was unconstitutional. 36
Finally, in 1968 the Fair Housing Act actively banned even private
racial discrimination "in the sale, rental, and financing of dwellings,
and in other housing-related transactions." 37
Equally important to these legal changes, white public opinion
began to turn against racial segregation. As late as 1964, 35% of
whites agreed when asked whether "[w]hite people have a right to
keep (Negroes/black people) out of their neighborhoods." By 1972,
that number had fallen to 20%, and by 1976 it had fallen to 10%.38
Thus, explicit racial discrimination was the core factor behind
the creation of concentrated African-American poverty, but it is less
satisfactory as an explanation of the perpetuation and intensification
of the phenomenon over the last forty years. Some degree of racial
discrimination in housing undoubtedly persists to the present day, 39
but it lacks the systematic, institutional character of the of pre-civil
rights discrimination. 40 To understand why so many African
URBAN HOUSING POLICY IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA 226, 236-41 (John F. Bauman

et al., eds. 2000).
35. See JACKSON, supra note. 28, at 214-215. Although, as we shall see, the damage
had already been done. The federal government continues to dramatically subsidize
homeownership. Even though these subsidies are no longer administered along racial
lines, they still benefit whites disproportionately because earlier policies encouraging
homeownership were available only to whites. See infra Sections II.C. & III.A.
36. Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369,376 (1967).
37. U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, Fair Housing Laws and
Presidential Executive Orders, available at http://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/HUD?
src=/program-offices/fair-housing-equal-opp/FHLaws; see 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-19.
38. See HOWARD SCHUMAN Er AL., RACIAL ATTITUDES IN AMERICA: TRENDS AND
INTERPRETATIONS 106-7, 111-4 (1997 ed).
39. See

ANDREW

WIESE,

PLACES

OF

THEIR

OWN:

AFRICAN

AMERICAN

SUBURBANIZATION IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 267 (2004); Sheryll D. Cashin, Middle-

Class Black Suburbs and the State of Integration:A Post-IntegrationistVision for Metropolitan
America, 86 CORNELL L. REv. 729, 737-8, 743-4 (2001)
40. Indeed, even if they did not alleviate the problem of concentrated AfricanAmerican poverty, the Fair Housing Act and the Civil Rights movement more generally
did contribute to the development of a substantial black, middle class, suburban
population. By 1998, more than a third of black households earned more than the
national median income. WIESE, supra note 39, at 260. And a roughly similar percentage
of African Americans lived in the suburbs, more than double the number than in 1970.
Cashin, supra note. 39, at 736. But the fact that African Americans on the whole are better
off today than in 1970 should not mask the fact that African Americans continue to
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Americans remain concentrated in urban slums, one must look to
factors beyond explicit racial discrimination.
B.

The Public Housing Debacle
The Civil Rights movement fundamentally changed the
discourse surrounding housing policy in the United States. Not only
would the government no longer work to actively promote separate
and unequal housing for African Americans; it would work, in the
words of President Johnson, to "rebuild cities" and "place a decent
home within the reach of [all] families," including African
Americans. 41 The new dilemma facing policy-makers was how to
effectively achieve this goal.
For the urban reformers of the 1950s and 1960s, the answer lay
in public housing. As early as the 1930s, urban planners had begun
to argue that "ordinary laws of supply and demand" had failed the
housing market, and that public housing for the poor was a
necessary solution to the poverty of the Great Depression. 42 In 1937,
the Wagner Public Housing Act authorized funding for local
authorities to designate certain neighborhoods as blighted, purchase
the property and bulldoze the neighborhood, and construct public
housing in its place.4 3 This program of "slum clearance" gained
even more traction in the years following World War II, and
Congressional Acts in 1949 and 1954 further strengthened the public
housing mandate. 44 It was under the Johnson administration,
however, that the government fully embraced to public housing as a
solution to inner city poverty. All told, between 1950 and 1968
nearly 500,000 poor Americans were relocated into public housing
projects, and - building off the momentum of Johnson's efforts another 375,000 units were made available for occupancy between
1968 and 1973.45
Though well intentioned, public housing programs suffered
comprise a vastly disproportionate number of impoverished inner city residents. Nor
should it hide the fact that this disadvantage is a direct legacy of our country's racially
discriminatory past.
41. Lyndon B. Johnson, Annual Message to the Congress on the State of the Union
(January 17, 1968), available at http://www.1bjlib.utexas.edu/johnson/archives.hom
/speeches.hom/680117.asp.
42. BRADFORD D. HUNT, BLUEPRINT FOR DISASTER: THE UNRAVELING OF CHICAGO
PUBLIC HOUSING 17-22 (2009).

43. See Gail Radford, The Federal Government and Housing During the Great Depression,
in FROM TENEMENTS TO TAYLOR HOMES, supra note 34, at 102, 110-12.
44. See Roger Biles, Public Housing and the Postwar Urban Renaissance, 1949-1973, in
FROM TENEMENTS TO TAYLOR HOMES, supra note 34 at 143, 143-147.
45. J. Paul Mitchell, The Historical Context for Housing Policy, in FEDERAL HOUSING
POLICY & PROGRAMS: PAST AND PRESENT 1, 12 (J. Paul Mitchell, ed., 1990).
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from problems in conception, funding, and execution, and
ultimately did much more harm than good for the poorer residents
of American cities. Because public housing projects were located on
the same land as the blighted "slums" they were replacing, they did
little to alter the racial or socioeconomic makeup of neighborhoods.
Housing administrators made some attempts at racial integration,
but vast disparities in demand made this simply unfeasible, and the
goal was quickly abandoned. Entire neighborhoods of African
Americans had been left without homes due to slum clearance, and
they needed someplace to live. Most whites, for their part, had
neither the need nor desire to live in predominantly AfricanAmerican public housing. 46
Public housing not only failed to promote racial and
socioeconomic integration; it concentrated African-American
By moving entire communities into
poverty even further.
overcrowded concrete high-rise complexes that the Chicago
Defender accurately characterized as "prison-like," public housing
destroyed any possibility of residential mobility that poor African
Americans may have had and provided stark visual warnings for
everyone else, including businesses, to stay away.4 7 Anyone who
could afford to lived as far away as possible from the projects and
those who remained became even poorer and more isolated. 48 By
1984 the city of Chicago, for instance, had roughly 30,000 families
living in public housing projects. Ninety-five percent of these
families were African-American; only ten percent reported
employment; and of the families with children, only seven percent
had two parents. 49
The harmful nature of public housing quickly became apparent,
and public opinion turned strongly against the program. Indeed,
public housing had received its share of criticism from its inception,
and by the mid-1970s construction of new projects had essentially
ceased.50 But once constructed, public housing projects could not
easily be dismantled, as they provided residency for hundreds of
thousands of families. As the statistics from Chicago cited above
show, the projects remained a prominent fixture of urban American
life well into the 1980s, and their subsequent dismantling has
46. See HUNT, supra note 42, at 99-120.
47. See id. at 121-212.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 183-84. Nationally, in 1990 public housing constituted 1.5% of the nation's
housing stock. The average annual income of resident households was $6,539. See
Michael H. Schill, Privatizing Federal Low Income Housing Assistance: The Case of Public
Housing, 75 CORNELL L. REv. 877, 897 (1990).
50. Mitchell, supra note. 46, at 12-3.
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proceeded slowly. Despite nearly universal recognition of the
venture's failures, as recently as 2009 Atlanta was the only major
American city to have fully eliminated all of its large housing
projects.5 1
C. Tax, Education, and Land-Use Regulations
Racial discrimination and the public housing debacle created
the current concentration of poor African Americans in American
inner cities. But this concentrated poverty has been maintained and
exacerbated, despite efforts to combat it,52 by ongoing government
policies that incentivize and enable wealthier Americans to keep
Because racial
poorer Americans out of their neighborhoods.
discrimination and public housing placed African Americans in the
country's poorest neighborhoods, these economic regulations
operate in practice to severely limit residential mobility for poor
African Americans.
The first government policy promoting economic residential
segregation is the continued federal subsidization of personal home
ownership through the Internal Revenue Code. Most notably,
section 163(h) of the code (the "home mortgage interest deduction")
allows homeowners to deduct their mortgage interest payments and
property taxes from their federal income tax; and section 121 of the
code exempts from income taxes the capital gains earned through
appreciation in the value of a home.53 Taken together, these
provisions provide homeowners with a tax deduction proportional
to the purchase price of their home and exempt from taxes
altogether income earned through appreciations in housing values.
Economists estimate that combined, these tax expenditures provide
more than $100 billion per year of subsidies to homeowners and
developers. 54
These expenditures not only benefit homeowners at the expense
51. Last Housing Project in Atlanta Nears Demise, ASSOCIATED PRESS, (July 27, 2009),
available at http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/32176690/ns/us-news-life/. Other cities,
of course, are also making efforts to eliminate their large housing projects. But because
of the difficulties of finding new residencies for all their residents, they have not yet
completed these projects.
52. These efforts will be discussed in Part IV, infra.
53. I.R.C. §§ 163(h), 121.
54. See JOINT CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, ESTIMATES OF FEDERAL
TAX EXPENDITURES FOR FISCAL YEARS 2007-2011, at 27 (2007) (data on magnitude of
expenditures) [Hereinafter CONGRESSIONAL TAX EXPENDITURE DATA]. The benefits of

these subsidies accrue allocated across the housing value chain (in other words, between
those who develop, construct, and sell homes, and those who purchase them) based on
the various elasticities of supply and demand. See GLAESER & GYouRKo, supra note 10, at
95-6.
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of renters, but also disproportionately benefit the wealthiest
homeowners. Because they are awarded in the form of income tax
deductions and exemptions (as opposed to tax credits), those with
the highest marginal tax rates receive the highest proportional
benefits. Additionally, the home mortgage interest deduction is
awarded as a so-called "below-the-line" deduction, meaning it only
benefits taxpayers who choose to itemize their deductions rather
than take the so-called "standard deduction."55 Itemization of
below-the-line deductions, for its part, tends to be a financially
logical decision only for households with fairly high incomes.5 6 As a
result, more than 75% of the value of these returns accrues to those
earning more than $100,000 per year. Less than 2% of the value
accrues to those earning less than $40,000 per year.57
Bearing these background facts in mind, these tax expenditures
contribute to residential segregation in two ways. First, at least some
of the subsidies' benefits accrue to home "producers" (developers,
construction companies, real estate agents, etc.) in the form of higher
housing prices.58 This means that producers have an incentive to
build houses for which the homeowner will receive a large
deduction. Since only housing consumers with fairly high incomes
receive a large deduction, producers have an incentive to construct
and sell housing only to wealthier buyers and then raise prices on
these houses even more to capture some of the benefits of
government subsidization. It thereby becomes more difficult for
poorer families looking to move out of the inner city to find housing
they can afford.
Second, and perhaps even more importantly, by encouraging
Americans to invest a disproportionately high percentage of their
wealth in homeownership, 59 the tax code creates incentives for
wealthy Americans to keep poorer Americans out of their
neighborhoods through other means, lest the presence of less
affluent neighbors drive down the price of their own home.
These exclusionary incentives are reinforced by the structure of
55. See IRC §§ 61-3, 67.
56. For instance, one study estimates that while 63% of all homeowners itemize,
only 23% of those with incomes below $40,000 do. On the other hand, the study
estimates, 98% of homeowners with incomes above $125,000 itemize. See GLAESER &
GYOURKO, supra note 10, at 94.
57. Calculations based on data in CONGRESSIONAL TAX EXPENDITURE DATA, supra

note 54, at 39, 43.
58. Id.
59. As of 2004, more than 40 percent of Americans' net worth was concentrated in
home equity. See THOMAS M. SHAPIRO, THE HIDDEN COST OF BEING AFRICAN AMERICAN:
How WEALTH PERPETUATES INEQUALITY 107 (2004).
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our nation's public education system. Each state has its own
generally complex system for funding public schools, but nearly all
funding is at least somewhat proportional to the property taxes
collected in each school district. 60 Thus, schools in wealthier
neighborhoods are generally much better funded than those in
poorer neighborhoods, and families who pay below the mean
property tax in a well-funded school district effectively free ride 61 on
the education paid for by their wealthier neighbors. The Supreme
Court has explicitly affirmed the constitutionality of such systemS 62
while simultaneously limiting poorer students' ability to attend
These
districts. 63
neighboring
in better-funded
schools
circumstances provide a strong incentive for residents in any school
district to preclude the development of housing of lower value than
their own.
It is hard to imagine two things more important to most middleclass, upper-middle class, and upper-class households than
maintaining and increasing their wealth and providing their kids
with a quality education. Indeed, both are laudable goals when
pursued properly. The problem is that the tax code and our public
education system provide incentives for wealthier Americans to
pursue these goals in a hardly commendable manner - by fighting
against economic residential integration. And fight they do. As
William Fischel has written, "concern for home values is the central
motivator of local government behavior."64
The primary way local governments fight against integration is
through zoning ordinances. Zoning laws developed in the early
twentieth century as a way for local governments to plan the
development of their municipalities through restrictions on the uses
of land.65 Though zoning laws may have some valuable uses (such
as insulating residential areas from industrial pollution), they are
often thinly veiled efforts to promote far less benign goals. One such
60. See Daphne A. Kenyon, The Property Tax - School Funding Dilemma, LINCOLN
INST. OF LAND POLICY (2007).

61. I use this term descriptively, not to connote any expressive judgment.
62. See San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
63. See Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
64. WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, THE HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS: How HOME VALUES
INFLUENCE LOCAL GOVERNMENT TAXATION, SCHOOL FINANCE, AND LAND-USE POLICIEs 5
(2001); see also MARC L. SILVER & MARTIN MELKONIAN, EDS., CONTESTED TERRAIN:

POWER, POLITICS, AND PARTICIPATION IN SUBURBIA (1995) (discussing forces shaping

suburban politics, including the maintenance of home values).
65. The objectives of these restrictions range from aesthetics to historical
preservation to insulating residents from pollution to (at least in theory) promoting
economic growth. See Village of Euclid v. Amber Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926);
Standard State Zoning Enabling Act (1928);
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restriction that is particularly common in suburban communities
throughout the United States is large-lot zoning, which precludes the
construction of new homes below a certain lot size. Although
justified as a measure to preserve the aesthetic appeal of a
neighborhood, large-lot zoning ordinances operate as explicitly
exclusionary laws that prop up housing values in suburban
neighborhoods and preclude non-wealthy families who cannot
afford the larger lots from moving in.66 These exclusionary effects of
large-lot zoning are augmented by similar land use restrictions
regulating, among other constraints, property set-backs from the
street, maximum population densities in certain neighborhoods, and
units per acre in multi-unit buildings. 67 Some even require houses
to have swimming pools or tennis courts. 68
Thus, as African Americans (and others) from the inner-city
look to relocate to less poverty-ridden neighborhoods, exclusionary
zoning ordinances substantially limit the amount of housing
available and raise the costs of that housing, making it very difficult
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has
for them to move.
aggressively protected the constitutionality of exclusionary zoning
ordinances. The Court has placed stringent limitations on the class
of plaintiffs with standing to challenge a zoning ordinance 69 and
required that plaintiffs prove that the zoning ordinance was
motivated by a racially discriminatory intent or purpose; a disparate
racial impact of any magnitude is insufficient for invalidation. 70
In addition to zoning ordinances, local building codes also serve
to solidify the contours of residential segregation. In their modern
form, building codes are an outgrowth of the "progressive" attempt
of the early twentieth century to improve health and safety
standards in urban environments. They generally include ostensibly
66. Economists estimate that as the average minimum lot size in a community rises
by one acre per lot, prices increase by more than ten percent per house and the overall
housing stock in the community declines by more than 30%. GLAESER & GYOURKO, supra
note 10, at 66-7; See id. at 77-8 ("[Lland scarcity is not the primary motivation for strict
land-use controls. ... [T]he strong positive relation of regulatory strictiness with various
measures of community wealth suggests exclusionary desires are a key factor in many
places.").
67. See, e.g., Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 522 (1975) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(discussing zoning requirements regulating "lot area, set backs, population density,
density of use, units per acre, floor area, sewer requirements, traffic flow, ingress and
egress, and street location").
68. See BENJAMIN F. BOBO, LOCKED IN AND LOCKED OUT: THE IMPACT OF URBAN
LAND USE POLICY AND MARKET FORCES ON AFRICAN AMERICANS 25 (2001).

69. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. at 490.
70. Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., 429
U.S. 252 (1977).

Summer 2012]

A DEREGULATORY FRAMEWORK

571

uncontroversial requirements that address buildings' basic
materials, structure, plumbing, and electricity. Yet by precluding the
construction of housing that urban planners have deemed unfit,
building codes, like zoning restrictions, act to increase housing
prices and reduce stock.71
Unlike zoning restrictions, building codes' impact on prices in
wealthier suburban areas is generally minimal. 72 But building codes
nevertheless contribute to the perpetuation of concentrated poverty
and residential segregation by raising home prices within inner
cities. There, even small increases in prices can make it more
difficult for poor African Americans to acquire home equity within
their neighborhoods that, in turn, could help them accumulate
wealth to move out. Indeed, it was this "poor-as-landlords"
phenomenon that helped make the immigrant urban "ghettos" of the
early twentieth century launching pads for integration into broader
society,
not permanent
confinements. 73 Moreover,
while
contemporaneous urban reformers viewed these building code-less
communities as "places of disease, high death rates, and social
disorganization," most modern scholars dispute this characterization
and question the need for most types of codes. 74
Thus, while nominally uncontroversial, building codes, like
zoning restrictions, may contribute to residential segregation and
concentrated poverty. And their alleged positive values may be
overrated.
D. Tying It Together
Explicit racial discrimination, both by private individuals and
the government, created the phenomenon of concentrated AfricanAmerican poverty in American cities.
But the causes of its
perpetuation run much deeper. Even as the vast majority of
Americans have become committed to some notion of racial justice
and equality, and even as some aspects of our legal system explicitly
outlaw racial discrimination in housing, other laws and policies
continue to solidify and exacerbate the concentrated AfricanAmerican poverty that our racist past created. Some of these policies
71. Building codes increase housing prices by making it more costly to produce
housing. These costs include the substantive costs of compliance (e.g., using possibly
more expensive material), and the regulatory costs of ensuring compliance (hiring
lawyers, preparing for inspections, etc.). See William Tucker, Building Codes, Housing
Prices, and the Poor in HOUSING AMERICA, supra note 15, at 65, 66-7; GLAESER & GYOURKO,
supra note 10, at 62-4.
72. Tucker, supra note 71, at 67; GLAESER & GYOURKO, supra note 10, at 63.
73. Tucker, supra note 71, at 72-81.
74. GLAAB & BROWN, supra note 19, at 142.
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were benevolently intentioned; others may have deliberately sought
to privilege the wealthy, even if they lacked an explicit racial
motivation. But in either case they have served, and continue to
serve, to solidify and perpetuate concentrated African-American
poverty.
As we turn to examine the various attempts to alleviate
concentrated African-American poverty, it is crucial to bear this full
set of causes in mind. But first, we must detour briefly to an equally
important question: why concentrated African-American poverty is
a problem in the first place.

II. Why Concentrated African-American Poverty Matters
In recent years, a number of scholars have begun to challenge
the long-held intuitive view that concentrated poverty has negative
consequences.75 These scholars do not dispute that residents of poor
neighborhoods are worse off than residents of wealthier
neighborhoods along a variety of social and economic dimensions.
Rather, they question whether these conditions are a consequence of
neighborhood effects rather than simply of being poor. 76 This
Section will discuss several of concentrated poverty's negative
effects for both the residents of impoverished neighborhoods and for
It will then discuss the arguments
society more generally.
challenging these effects, and whether or not they are persuasive.
A. Economic and Educational Effects
The most tangible negative effect of concentrated poverty is on
the educational and economic opportunities available to residents of
poor neighborhoods. As discussed in Section II.C., the tax code
allows wealthier homeowners to invest and accumulate wealth taxfree through homeownership. Not only, as discussed, does this
provide incentives for residents in wealthy neighborhoods to keep
the poor out; but once exiled, the poor are unable to invest in one of
the easiest ways to accumulate wealth and escape poverty:
homeownership. Most residents of poor neighborhoods are renters,
and even those who are homeowners lack sufficient income to
benefit from the homeownership tax subsidies. This, in turn, makes
it more difficult for residents of poor neighborhoods to accumulate
even low levels of personal savings that they can invest in the
75. See generally Ellickson, supra n. 10, at 1012-6 (providing an overview of these
arguments).
76. See, e.g., Jeffrey R. Kling, Jeffrey B. Liebman, & Lawrence F. Katz, Experimental
Analysis of Neighborhood Effects, 75 ECONOMETRICA 83, 83-84 (2007).
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education and economic development of future generations. It then
becomes even more difficult for those future generations to invest in
homeownership themselves (and, thereby, in the tax free
accumulation of wealth). 77
Compounding this wealth effect is the fact that businesses tend
to locate closer to affluent suburban neighborhoods than to inner
cities. Since 1980, more than two-thirds of employment growth has
occurred outside of city centers, and today roughly 70% of
manufacturing, wholesale, and retail trade jobs are located in the
suburbs. 78 In Cleveland, for example, although entry-level workers
are concentrated in inner-city neighborhoods, 80% of the entry-level
Like homeownership
jobs are located in the suburbs. 79
subsidization, this "spatial mismatch"8 0 between the poor and job
opportunities contributes to a self-perpetuating cycle of inner-city
poverty. When the poor are isolated, businesses don't locate near
the poor. This makes it more difficult for the poor to obtain jobs
than it otherwise would be. And this, of course, makes them even
poorer.
Concentrated poverty also negatively impacts inner city
residents' educational opportunities, further limiting their upward
mobility in society. As discussed in Section II.C., public schools are
often financed proportionally to district property taxes, and high
poverty schools, especially high-poverty urban schools, almost
always have lower levels of academic achievement than low-poverty
schools. 81 Yet the educational disadvantages of attending a highinsufficient funding.
transcend
school
poverty inner-city
Interestingly, even where litigation or state legislative decisions have
mandated that high-poverty schools receive equal funding, the
achievement gap remains high. 82 A variety of factors help explain
this outcome, nearly all related to the effects of concentrated
poverty. For instance, in high poverty urban neighborhoods, a
majority of decent-paying jobs are often in the public school system.
This lends itself to high levels of patronage in the hiring of teachers
(those hired are not the most qualified) and other employees (more
support staff are hired than is actually necessary). Patronage not
77. As evidence of this phenomenon, nearly fifty percent of white Americans who
bought homes in the early 1990s did so with support from family savings, while only 12%
of African-American families received similar support. SHAPIRO, supra note 59, at 113.
78. WILSON, supra note 4, at 41 (2009).
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. JAMES E. RYAN, FIVE MILES AWAY A WORLD APART: ONE CITY, Two SCHOOLS,
AND THE STORY OF EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY INMODERN AMFRICA 157 (2010).

82. Id. at 157-61.
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only reduces the effectiveness of the money schools are given, but
creates a (not inaccurate) public perception of wastefulness, which,
in turn, makes it even more difficult to obtain funding for resources
that actually are needed.8 3
Cultural Effects
Despite the concrete educational and economic impacts of
concentrated poverty, academic and popular debates have often
focused instead on the less tangible cultural impacts of concentrated
African-American poverty. This can be credited largely to a 1965
report by Daniel Patrick Moynihan (at the time Lyndon Johnson's
Assistant Secretary of Labor for Policy) entitled "The Negro Family:
The Case for National Action."84 Moynihan's report deserves praise
as one of the first nationally prominent documents to present
concentrated African-American poverty as a social problem, but his
specific conclusions were dubious and understandably controversial.
Moynihan argued that "the fundamental problem" facing inner city
African Americans was that "the Negro community has been forced
into a matriarchal structure which, because it is so out of line with
the rest of the American society, seriously retards the progress of the
group as a whole, and imposes a crushing burden on the Negro
male."85 This argument was unsurprisingly the subject of substantial
criticism, 86 and it provided straw-man fodder for those seeking to
argue that concentrated poverty is not a serious problem in the first
place.87
In recent years, however, sociologists have once again begun to
argue that "culture and persistent poverty are enmeshed," albeit in
more nuanced ways than those articulated in the Moynihan Report.8 8
William Julius Wilson, a prominent sociologist who has written
extensively on the topic, defines culture as the way "individuals in a
community develop an understanding of how the world works and
make decisions based on that understanding." 89 Sociologists have
B.

83. Id. at 161-64.
84. Office of Policy Planning and Research, United States Department of Labor, The
Negro Family: The Case for National Action (March 1965), available at http://www.
dol.gov/oasam/programs/history/webid-meynihan.htm.
85. Id. ch. 4.
86. See, e.g., WILLIAM RYAN, BLAMING THE VIcTIM 65-7 (1976 ed.).
87. See William Graebner, The End of Liberalism: Narrating Welfare's Decline, from the
Moynihan Report (1965) to the PersonalResponsibility and Work OpportunityAct (1996), 14 J.
POL. HIST. 170 (2002) (discussing role of Moynihan Report in shaping subsequent welfare
policy).
88. Patricia Cohen, Culture of Poverty Makes a Comeback, N.Y. TIMES (October 17,
2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/18/us/18poverty.html.
89. Id.
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articulated several ways in which poverty stricken communities
develop cultural norms with deleterious neighborhood effects.
For instance, in the domain of violent crime, sociologist Robert
Sampson has argued that it is not merely individual instances of
poverty but community norms created by concentrated poverty that
Among other detrimental
give rise to higher crime rates. 90
consequences, high crime rates contribute further to the poverty of a
neighborhood because many employers refuse to hire persons with
criminal records. Similarly, in the domain of education, many
studies suggest that in socioeconomically diverse environments the
higher academic aspirations of wealthier students can be
"contagious" and raise the aspirations and motivation of poorer
students. In environments of concentrated poverty, in contrast,
lower expectations can be self-reinforcing across peers, diminishing
academic success and future income potential. 91
These cultural effects are exacerbated by the strong racial
component to concentrated poverty. When young African
Americans are brought up in a world surrounded only by other poor
African Americans, they may begin to feel the deck is stacked
against them because of their race. 92 This can lead them to approach
new situations with particular skepticism and mistrust, making
social mobility even more difficult. 93
Because these cultural effects are difficult to quantify, their
magnitude remains in question. 94 It is particularly difficult to
disentangle the cultural effects of growing up in a poor
neighborhood from those of growing up in a poor family, the latter
of which would be present even without residential segregation.95
Yet when the cultural effects of poverty are combined with the
structural economic effects described above, it becomes less
important whether they occur at the family or neighborhood level.
Since the existence of poverty-stricken neighborhoods is one driver
of the poverty of its residents, even the cultural effects of growing up
in a poor family are, indirectly, exacerbated through concentrated
90. See Robert J. Sampson, Crime and Public Safety: Insights from Community-Level
Perspectives on Social Capital, in SOCIAL CAPITAL AND POOR COMMUNITIES 89 (Saegert et
al., eds. 2001).
91. JAMES E. RYAN, supra note 81, at 165.
92. WILSON, supra note 4, at 17-8.
93. Id.
94. Ellickson, supra note 10, at 1012-6.
95. See Philip Orepoulus, The Long-Run Consequences of Living in a Poor Neighborhood,
118 Q. J.ECON. 1533 (2003). But see Sampson et al., Durable Effects on Verbal Ability, supra
n.9 (providing a quantitative argument that certain negative cultural effects of
concentrated poverty do occur at the neighborhood level, not merely the family level).
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poverty. As William Julius Wilson writes, "structural conditions
provide the context within which cultural responses to chronic
economic and racial subordination are developed." 96 And, as
described in the previous paragraph, these cultural forces
themselves exacerbate the poverty of poor inner city African
Americans, further reinforcing the self-perpetuating cycle of innercity poverty across generations.
C. Diversity and Citizenship
Both the structural and cultural effects described above relate to
the detrimental effects of concentrated poverty on the residents of
poor neighborhoods. But concentrated African-American poverty
also impacts society more generally by affecting the way wealthier
and poorer Americans interact in our broader civic community.
First, residential segregation can foster general attitudes of
distrust between members of separated communities. Studies by
social psychologists and sociologists suggest that people find it
easier to trust one another and cooperate when there is less social
distance between them - in other words, when they have a shared
identity. 97 Identity, of course, is determined by factors beyond
geography, including socioeconomic class, religion, ethnicity, and
family structure, among others. But conceptions of identity are
themselves dynamic and malleable. Geographic proximity forges
common experiences - be they at schools, grocery stores, or parks that can play an important role over time in closing the social
distance between families and creating new, shared identities. 98 This
is particularly important in light of the extensive racial element to
concentrated poverty. Studies suggest that subconscious racial bias
and distrust remain prevalent across our society, and residential
integration can potentially play a useful role in reducing this bias by
fostering shared trans-racial identities. 99
Second, and more tangibly, when wealthier Americans are
geographically insulated from the realities of urban poverty, they are
much less likely to embrace the need to alleviate that poverty.
Multiple studies by political scientists suggest that while wealthy
persons generally vote their class interests, those who are exposed
96. WILSON, supra note 4, at 61.

97. See Robert D. Putnam, E Pluribus Unum: Diversity and Community in the TwentyFirst Century: The 2006 Johan Skytte Prize Lecture, 30 SCANDINAVIAN POL. STUDIES 137, 159
(2007).
98. Id. at 161-62.
99. Cf. Christine Jolls & Cass R. Sunstein, The Law of Implicit Bias, 94 CALIF. L. REV.
969 (2006) (discussing implicit racial biases and potential de-biasing techniques).
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socially to members of other classes are less likely on the margins to
do so. 100 This is hardly surprising given general patterns of voting
behavior. Voters are influenced by self-interest, but they also can be
moved by moral persuasion. 101 And it is far easier to persuade a
wealthy person to vote for policies that address poverty when the
person personally confronts poverty's realities on a day-to-day basis.
Thus, even leaving aside the negative consequences of
concentrated poverty for the poor, residential segregation makes it
more difficult to build the coalitions necessary to address issues of
poverty and inequality in the first place. This is not to take a
position on what those policies should be - an issue well beyond
this paper's already expansive scope. But it is to say that the
political debates and interest group bargaining that generate these
policies would be enhanced through residential integration.
D. The Moving to Opportunity Program
Scholars who have challenged the negative effects of
concentrated African-American poverty have done so largely by
relying on the Moving to Opportunity program ("MTO"), a social
experiment that evaluated the effects of poverty relocation programs
in five cities.102 Specifically, the MTO Program tracked the impact of
various government poverty de-concentration programs from 1994
through 2002 and compared them to a control group of families who
remained in their poor neighborhoods without government
assistance. MTO documented impacts of the programs in five
cities - Baltimore, Boston, Chicago, Los Angeles, and New York along five dimensions: economic self-sufficiency, mental health,
physical health, risky behavior, and education.103
In their analysis of the MTO data, researchers found that mental
health was the only dimension along which the study documented
statistically significant improvements for all persons. Teenage
females demonstrated statistically significant improvements along
some of the other dimensions (such as through improved
educational outcomes), but these were offset by equally sizable
100. See, e.g., Robert Andersen & Anthony Heath, Social Class and Voting: A MultiLevel Analysis of Individual and Constituency Differences, Centre for Research Into Elections
and Social Trends Working Paper 83 (2000), available at http://www.crest.ox.
ac.uk/papers/p83.pdf; Carlos 1. Vilatla y Perdomo, Voting Behavior in a City of Poor
Workers and Rich Entrepreneurs: Local Contextual Effects and Class Voting in the Mexico City
Metropolitan Area, 1994-2000, EGAP Working Paper (2007), available at http://
alejandria.ccm.itesm.mx/egap/documentos/EGAP-2007-05.pdf.
101. I owe this insight to conversations with political scientist Ian Shapiro.
102. See Kling et al., supra note 76, at 84.
103. Id.
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deteriorations among teenage males. Adults did not demonstrate
any statistically significant changes one way or the other outside
mental health.104 All told, several commentators have argued, these
findings suggest that "the net social benefits of the economic and
racial integration of neighborhoods, while probably still positive, are
not as large as previously thought." 05
The conclusions regarding the MTO program, however, are
more relevant for analyzing solutions to combat concentrated
poverty than for analyzing its consequences. The MTO provides
important insights on the strengths and shortcomings of some of the
particular government programs it evaluated. 106 But the fact that
certain relocation programs failed to produce benefits for relocated
residents does not mean that concentrated poverty more generally
does not produce long-term negative effects.
The reasoning that draws this conclusion from the MTO results
is flawed for two reasons. First, as explained above, the negative
impacts of concentrated poverty are not limited to the immediate
experience of living in a poor neighborhood. Rather, as discussed,
concentrated poverty's consequences operate across a much longer
time horizon. Poor families are poor in the first place partly because
of concentrated poverty, and a few years of integration can hardly be
expected to alleviate that. A poor education, a criminal record, and a
lack of home equity do not simply disappear when a family moves
to a wealthier neighborhood.
Put otherwise, relocation, of itself, cannot be expected to
alleviate poverty. But over time, relocation can enable poor families
to raise their children in a setting where they are not structurally
disadvantaged and where they may be able to slowly improve their
families' socioeconomic status. Without residential integration, poor
African-American families will never be able to escape the selfperpetuating poverty trap in which they find themselves. But to see
these positive benefits reflected in the metrics MTO tracked for
would require decades, if not generations, of integration. After all,
that is how long the negative effects of concentrated AfricanAmerican poverty have been allowed to compound.
Second, the programs the MTO tracked did not systematically
alleviate concentrated African-American poverty or address the
structural forces that perpetuate it; they simply relocated certain
104. Id. at 91, 99-105.
105. Ellickson, supra note 10, at 1013; see also Kling et al., supra note 76, at 109
(concluding associations between concentrated neighborhood poverty and "individual
outcomes ... appear to be much weaker" than previously thought).
106. See infra Section IV.
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families to wealthier neighborhoods. Thus, using the MTO to
evaluate the effects of concentrated poverty more generally involves
a false analytical dichotomy between living in a poverty-stricken
neighborhood and living as one of the few poor families in a
wealthier neighborhood. The latter context could induce several
negative effects of its own, including social and cultural isolation
and despair at being surrounded by higher achieving peers and
colleagues with greater opportunities. Indeed, these effects may be
partially responsible for the actively detrimental impact MTO
relocation had on teenage males, who would be particularly
susceptible.1 07 These effects would not necessarily be present,
however, in a more systematically and organically integrated
neighborhood. Poorer families would be less socially isolated and
neighborhoods could develop cultural identities and norms that
transcended economic status and race. Certainly, poor families
would still encounter more advantaged colleagues and peers, but
they would no longer dominate the neighborhood socially or
culturally.
All this is not to say that the results of the MTO are devoid of
import. The MTO tracked the impact of actual government
programs to de-concentrate poverty, and even if its findings do not
shed substantial new insight on the underlying problem of
concentrated poverty, they do suggest that the current policy
framework for addressing this problem may be in need of revision.
It is to these policies and their shortcomings that this paper will now
turn.

III. Attempted Solutions
Having analyzed the causes and consequences of concentrated
African-American poverty, we now turn to the question with which
this paper began: why, despite decades of efforts, have we not been
able to solve this problem? Current programs to fight concentrated
poverty generally fall into one of three categories: project-based
subsidies, tenant- and homeowner-based subsidies, and inclusionary
zoning. This section will evaluate each, in turn. But across all, the
same pattern of shortcomings emerges. Policies have focused on
government interventions in the housing market to compel
integration, but they have not addressed the existing government tax
provisions, land-use and education policies, and other regulations
that, as discussed in Section II.C., are responsible for the
perpetuation of concentrated African-American poverty in the first
107. See Kling et al., supra note 76, at 105-7.
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place. The result is that the programs often encounter severe local
opposition making them difficult to implement, and even when they
are effectively implemented they fail to induce systematic positive
change.
A. Project-Based Subsidies
The first way the government has worked to de-concentrate
poverty is through strategic subsidizes for certain low-income and
mixed-income private housing developments.
It is difficult to
characterize the precise nature or effects of these subsidies, since, as
Robert Ellickson writes, they encompass an "ever-changing panoply
of programs ... whose specifics are obscure to all but an intrepid
brand of specialists." 08
But it is fair to state two general
characteristics of the programs in aggregate.
First, most have as their explicit objective the promotion of
"affordable housing," with poverty de-concentration a secondary
consideration.109 For example, the Low-Income Housing Tax Credit
("LIHTC"), the largest of these programs, authorizes tax credits for
developers who set aside at least twenty percent of units as low-rent
dwellings for qualifying households. 1 0 Although this tax credit
could be used to promote integration, there is nothing inherent in its
design to preclude it from exclusively subsidizing developments in
poor neighborhoods inhabited entirely by low-income renters.
Indeed, the program somewhat bizarrely provides additional
incentives to developers who locate projects in high-poverty
neighborhoods."' Nevertheless, the theory goes, because private
developers will still want to turn a profit on the enterprise, they will
locate projects in areas where they can also attract higher income
renters.112 Supporters of the program thus claim that on balance it
will have "positive benefits with respect to racial integration."" 3
108. Ellickson, supra note 10, at 990.
109. There is a minority of programs for which this is not the case, most notably the
HOPE VI program. These will be discussed below.
110. See Ellickson, supra note 10, at 990; GLAESER & GYOURKO, supra note 10, at 1045; Ingrid Gould Ellen, Katherine M. O'Regan, & loan Voicu, Siting, Spillovers, and
Segregation: A Reexamination of the Low-Income Housing Tax Credit Program, in HOUSING
MARKETS AND THE ECONOMY: RISK, REGULATION, AND POLICY 233, 235 (Edward L.
Glaeser & John M. Quigley eds. 2009). [Hereinafter Ellen et. al., Sitting, Spillovers, and
Segregation].
111. Ellen et. al., Sitting, Spillovers, and Segregation, supra note 110 at 236, 238.
112. Id. at 239.
113. JOINT CENTER FOR HOUSING STUDIES OF HARVARD UNIVERSITY, LONG-TERM
Low INCOME HOUSING TAX CREDIT POLICY QUESTIONS 8 (2010) [Hereinafter LIHTC
available at http://www.jchs.harvard.edu/publications/
POLICY QUESTIONS],
governmentprograms/longterm-lowincome housing-taxcredit-policy-questions.pdf.
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The second general characteristic of most project-based
subsidies is that their practical implementation is left to state and
local authorities. 114 Even for subsidies funded by the federal
government like the LIHTC or the Community Development Block
Grant Program ("CDBGP"),i 5 state and local authorities control
1 6 Thus, their actual
which projects the subsidies actually fund.x
effect on concentrated poverty is highly dependant on the decisions
of local authorities.
The rationale for decentralizing programs to local authorities is
that residential patterns and poverty conditions vary by locality and
that local authorities are best placed to adapt subsidization
programs to these local realities.1 17 The problem with this approach
is that local authorities are subservient to the interests of residents
who elect them, and, as discussed in Section II.C., these residents
have a tangible interest in maintaining entrenched residential
segregation. Moreover, even subsidized private developments are
subject to the land-use restrictions, building controls, and other
regulations that many localities have already enacted to entrench
concentrated poverty in the first place. The result is that, in practice,
local authorities implement the subsidies in such a way that they do
little to alleviate concentrated poverty or residential segregation.
The ongoing legal disputes over affordable housing in
Westchester, New York, provide a powerful example of the inability
of affordable housing programs to overcome local resistance to
residential integration. Located just north of New York City,
Westchester is in many ways a socioeconomic cross-section of
America. It famously includes several of the country's wealthiest
suburbs such as Scarsdale and Bedford Village, where median
property values exceed $1 million. But it also includes poor AfricanAmerican neighborhoods such as Yonkers and White Plains 114. Ellickson, supra note 10, at 990.
115. In this program, the federal government funds local proposals to develop poor
communities, including through support for affordable housing. See http://www.
hud.gov/offices/cpd/communitydevelopment/programs/.
116. See, e.g., LIHTC POLIcY QUESTIONS, supra note 113, at 12 ("The separation
between the funding mechanism at the federal level and housing policy development
and implementation at the state and local level is a hallmark of the LIHTC program.");
Eli Saslow, In Southwest Va., As More Need Help, Aid OrganizationHas Less to Give, WASH.
POST (April 16, 2011), available at http://www.washingtonpost.com /national/insouthwest-va-as-more-need-help-aid-organization-has-less-to-give/2011/04/13/AFDA
hIsD-story.html?wpisrc=emailtoafriend (CDBG involves "minimal federal oversight").
117. See LIHTC POLICY QUESTIONS, supra note 113, at 12 ("The structure of the
program is perceived by many as one which enables states to more easily innovate and
make changes to reflect shifting local housing priorities within the existing program
design.").
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communities more akin to the inner city Bronx than a suburb.
The first major legal dispute over affordable housing in
Westchester occurred in Yonkers during the 1980s. Residentially,
Yonkers is a microcosm of Westchester more generally, with poor
African-American communities concentrated in the southwest of the
city and more affluent (though not quite Scarsdale-level affluent)
white communities located in the east. In the late 1970s and early
1980s, shortly after the adoption of the CDBGP, Yonkers began
applying for affordable housing funds under the program. Yonkers
housing officials filed CDPGP proposals with the federal
government that emphasized the need for housing development in
the eastern part of the city, but when it came to actually
implementing the programs, the City Council denied permitting to
any project located outside the poor, southwest neighborhoods. 118
In 1980, the Civil Rights Division of the Department of Justice
initiated a lawsuit against Yonkers. Judge Leonard Sand urged the
city to settle the lawsuit, but the council declined, instead fighting
the DOJ vigorously in protracted litigation. 119 In 1985, Judge Sand
ruled against the city, finding that the city council had engaged in
intentional racial segregation in its siting of affordable housing
units. 120 But even after Judge Sand's decision was upheld by the
Second Circuit Court of Appeals and the U.S. Supreme Court, the
battle was far from over.
After the Supreme Court upheld Judge Sand's finding of
liability, the judge had, in theory, unlimited authority to order the
City Council to undertake remedial action. Accordingly, Judge Sand
issued a broad remedial order involving the construction of
subsidized housing in east Yonkers and the dispersal of low-income
families into that housing. 121 The City Council, however, openly
obstructed the remedy's implementation, refusing to voluntarily
engage in any of the required rezoning or permitting. It swallowed
the heavy contempt fines Judge Sand leveled against it, and forced
Judge Sand to order the rezoning and permitting of each housing
unit, one at a time.122 Even as the standoff between the council and
Judge Sand threatened to bankrupt the city, in the 1987 municipal
elections the citizens of Yonkers voted for more defiance, reelecting
the most hard-line council members and voting out those who had

118. Schuck, supra note 12, at 325-27, 332-34.
119. For more details of the legal battle see id. at 333-43.
120. Id. at 343.
121. Id. at 345-50.
122. Id. at 352-54.
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supported compromise.123
Judge Sand and the citizens of East Yonkers continued this
game of chicken into the 1990s, with the City Council caught in the
middle. At one point, Judge Sand ordered a freeze on all private
development in Yonkers, emboldened by a Second Circuit decision
affirming the legality of his hard-line approach towards the city.
This measure inspired several City Council members to once again
urge compliance, but Judge Sand backed off when these council
members received a multitude of death threats from Yonkers
citizens. Indeed, with Yonkers on the brink of civil unrest more
reminiscent of Little Rock or Selma in the 1950s and 1960s than New
York in the 1990s, Judge Sand eventually took his foot off the gas.
The law may have been on his side, but President Clinton was not
about to send the National Guard in to do battle against a group of
upper-middle class New York suburbanites, a core part of his own
constituency. When all was said and done, two decades of legal
battles resulted in the construction of a whopping 200 affordable
housing units in east Yonkers. 124
Yet even as integrationists' efforts in Yonkers fizzled their way
to an anticlimactic finish, similar disputes over affordable housing in
Westchester more generally have continued. Most recently, in 2009
the Westchester County Board settled a lawsuit in which it admitted
to using federal affordable housing funding for projects that
reinforced existing patterns of residential segregation. 125 The county
agreed to spend $51.6 million to develop at least 750 units of
affordable housing in municipalities less than 3% African American
and less than 7% Latino populations. 126 The county also agreed to
use its authority to override local zoning restrictions and other
municipally created barriers.127
The county's compliance with the decree, however, has been
questionable at best. As recently as October 2010, only three of the
750 units had received all necessary funding, and not a single unit
123. Id. at 354.
124. Schuck, supra note 12, at 354-59.
125. See Anti-Discrimination Center, Federal Judge: Westchester Made False Claims to
U.S. Over 6-Year Period (February 2009), http://www.antibiaslaw.com/westchester-falseclaims-case/federal-judge-westchester-made-false-claims-us-iver-6year-period;
AntiDiscrimination Center, Anti-Discrimination Center Wins Unprecedented $62.5 Million
Settlement in Housing De-Segregation Case Against Westchester County (August 10, 2009),
http://www.antibiaslaw.com/sites/default/files/files/ADCrelease 20090810.pdf.
126. See Anti-Discrimination Center, Fact Sheet on Key Elements of the Settlement,
http://www.antibiaslaw.com/westchester-false-claims-case/fact-sheet-key-elementssettlement.
127. Id.
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had received approval for building permits.128 That same month, the
Mayor of Scarsdale reassured his constituents that county officials
did not intend to take any action against municipalities to compel
them to change their zoning codes. 129 And Westchester county
executives have continued to vigorously fight any efforts at real
change to their housing laws and practices.13 0 It is too early to
determine the ultimate outcome of this most recent litigation, but
there is little reason to believe it will ultimately have any greater
impact on integration than the Yonkers litigation of the 1980s and
1990s.
Westchester's experience with local resistance to integrated
affordable housing has hardly been unique. Political scientist
Edward Goetz, for instance, has copiously documented the local
resistance to the integration of affordable housing in Minneapolis,
Minnesota. 131 And national data reinforces the extent to which
federal affordable housing programs have done little to break down
entrenched concentrated poverty and residential segregation.
Analyses of the LIHTC, for instance, suggest that the siting of
developments has roughly mirrored existing distributions of
poverty. 132 Unlike the public housing projects of early eras,
affordable housing subsidies may not actively exacerbate
concentrated poverty. But as the experience with Westchester
shows, it is a dubious strategy for combating it.
Given the local resistance to integrating wealthy neighborhoods
with affordable housing, a few federal project-based subsidies have
taken an alternative approach to combating concentrated poverty.
Specifically, rather than bringing poor people into wealthy
neighborhoods they have sought to bring wealthy people into poor
neighborhoods. The most prominent of these programs is the HOPE
VI program, which funds local efforts to knock down "severely
stressed" public housing projects and replace them with mixed128. See Monitor's Report RegardingImplementation of Settlement For the Periodof July 7,
2010 Through October 25, 2010 at 3, United States ex rel. Anti-Discrimination Center of
New York v. Westchester County, New York, No. 06 Civ. 2860 (DLC) (S.D.N.Y. October
25, 2010), available at http://www.antibiaslaw.com/sites/default/files/files/Monitor
Report_-2010 10 25.pdf.
129. See Anti Discrimination Center: Court Monitor Bows to Westchester's Defiance of
Federal Court Desegregation Order While HUD and Justice Department's Civil Rights Division
Stand Idly By, Vocus (Oct. 28, 2010), http://www.prweb.com/releases/2010/10/
prweb4711004.htm.
130. See Press Release, Westchester County, Astorino: "Overreaching" by HUD on
Housing Settlement Puts Local Zoning at Risk (July 15, 2011), http://www3.Westchester
gov.com/news/3020-astorino-qoverreaching-by-hud-threatesn-housing-settlement.
131. GOETZ, supra note 11, at 137-76.
132. Ellen et al., Sitting, Spillovers, and Segregation,supra note 110, at 243.
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income developments. From its establishment in 1992 through 2004,
HOPE VI brought about the demolition of more than 60,000 public
housing units across 166 cities.133
The HOPE VI model of poverty de-concentration is politically
appealing because it does not threaten the integrity of alreadyestablished wealthy communities. The problem is that the displaced
residents of public housing projects need somewhere to live, and as
long as the overall structure of governmental regulations continues
to entrench concentrated poverty, they are likely to remain in poor
neighborhoods. Indeed, data suggests that while displaced public
housing residents end up living in somewhat less impoverished
neighborhoods than initially (hardly surprising considering the
locations are pre-selected for being in the worst living conditions in
the United States), they disproportionally remain in poor, AfricanAmerican areas. 134 And to the extent that some displaced families
have improved their conditions, it has been largely through the
receipt of housing vouchers, relocation support services, and other
tenant-based programs that operate independently of HOPE VI's
core mission of replacing public housing with mixed-income
developments. 135 Thus, it appears that the actual act of replacing
public housing with mixed-income housing serves primarily to
relocate, not de-concentrate poverty.
Moreover, while they are certainly preferable to public housing,
mixed-income projects themselves have several shortcomings as
tools to promote racial and socioeconomic integration. First, since all
the residents of mixed-income developments are renters, they
neither individually nor collectively as a neighborhood capture the
For higher income
benefits associated with homeownership.
market-rate renters, generally students and young professionals
living in the development for only a few years, this is insignificant. 1 36
For the poorer residents for whom the developments are permanent
homes, the consequences are far more substantial. Not owning
homes, they cannot capture the tax benefits that link
homeownership to long-term wealth accumulation. And since their
wealthier neighbors are not paying property taxes or sending their
kids to local schools, they fail to capture the educational benefits
associated with living in a wealthier neighborhood.
Second, mixed income developments and other project-based
subsidies suffer from a problem of scale. Whereas other entitlement
supra note 11, at 2.
134. Id. at 29.
135. Id. at 14-16. These tenant-based programs will be discussed in the next section.
136. See Brophy, supra note 11.
133. POPKIN ET AL.,
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programs for the poor like food stamps and welfare are available to
anyone who needs them, only 30% of qualified renters with incomes
below the federal poverty line benefit from any sort of federal
housing aid.137 This is a consequence of the fact that a substantial
portion of that aid is allocated through project-based subsidies,
which is available to the poor only to the extent that subsidized units
are actually constructed. Given the huge challenges involved in
ensuring that each subsidized project actually benefits the poor from local opposition to coordination between government and
private developers to finding locations with sufficient market
demand for non-subsidized units - it is hardly surprising that it has
not been possible to construct enough units.
Finally, mixed-income developments and other project-based
subsidies suffer from several economic inefficiencies as compared
with subsidies provided directly to the poor. First, subsidized
than
costs
administrative
higher
involve
developments
unsubsidized private developments. These costs derive from the
coordination between private developers and government and
across levels of government that are unique to subsidized
developments.13 8 Second, when a subsidy is associated with a
particular unit rather than a tenant, that tenant has no opportunity to
leave for alternative housing. Landlords thus face minimal market
pressure to construct units whose designs and features efficiently
meet low-income tenants' preferences, or to maintain building
standards and services once tenants have moved in.139
All told, then, project-based subsidies do not seem to be a viable
solution for addressing concentrated African-American poverty.
Implementing the programs in a way that actually promotes
integration requires the approval and support of the very localities
whose regulations have entrenched segregation in the first place.
And even to the extent that programs like HOPE VI create
developments in which poorer and wealthier tenants live side-byside, they are unlikely to fully capture the social or economic
Finally, by not
benefits of holistic neighborhood integration.
awarding subsidies directly to the people they are intended to
benefit -

the poor -

project-based subsidies create a variety of

otherwise avoidable inefficiencies. It is for this reason that many
housing economists, in particular, favor government programs that
provide housing assistance directly to the poor. It is to this category
of programs that this paper will now turn.
137. Ellickson, supra note 10, at 1003.
138. Id. at 997-98.
139. Id. at 998-1001.
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B. Tenant- and Homeowner-Based Subsidies
The programs described above all sought to combat
concentrated poverty by strategically subsidizing particular housing
projects. This section will discuss a set of programs that operate
instead by strategically subsidizing low-income renters and buyers.
In other words, they direct subsidies at the demand side rather than
the supply side of the housing market.
The largest and most prominent demand-side subsidy is the
Section 8 Voucher Program, which provides rental assistance to lowincome households. First established in 1974, the Section 8 Program
today serves roughly 1.8 million households, the most of any federal
housing subsidy. The precise nature of the program has varied over
time, but in its current form, it essentially allows poorer households
earning less than half the median income in an area to rent
something close to the median-price apartment in their area without
having to spend more than 30% of their own income in the
process.140 Additionally, in recent years several programs have
begun coupling Section 8 vouchers with mobility counseling to help
low-income families understand the implications of living in
different types of neighborhoods.141
Section 8 vouchers have several advantages over project-based
subsidies. Most notably, they are easier to implement effectively on
a large scale, and they lack the inefficiencies in construction costs
and market discipline associated with project-based subsidies. 142
Indeed, vouchers have been far more effective than project-based
subsidies at providing aid to the poor families who most need it.143
And low-income renters who relocate through vouchers generally
express much higher levels of satisfaction with their new housing
than those who relocate into subsidized projects.144
Nevertheless, most of the core obstacles that have prevented
project-based subsidies from substantially de-concentrating poverty
inhibit the effectiveness of Section 8 vouchers as well. Most
significantly, while Section 8 makes it easier for low-income tenants
to rent in wealthier neighborhoods on the margins, that boost still
occurs against the backdrop of the overall structure of land-use
140. GLAESER & GYOURKO, supra note 10, at 115-16.
141. See, e.g., Kling et al., supra note 76, at 84 (discussing mobility counseling in
context of MTO), POPKIN ET AL., supra note 11, at 33-49 (discussing mobility counseling in
the context of HOPE VI); Schuck, supra note 12, at 321 (discussing use of mobility
counseling in the context of the Gatreaux consent decree in Chicago).
142. See Ellickson, supra note 10, at 996-1003; Shuck, supra note 12, at 322.
143. See GLAESER & GYoURKO, supra note 10, at 116.
144. See Ellickson, supra note 10, at 1011.
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controls and other regulations that entrench concentrated poverty.
These regulations, as discussed in Section II.C., lead prices in
wealthier neighborhoods to be substantially higher than they would
in an unregulated market, partially if not wholly offsetting the
impact of vouchers. For instance, in 2010 the Section 8 program
dispersed roughly $17 billion of subsidies to low-income families. 145
The preferential tax treatment of home ownership alone provides
more than five times that amount annually to wealthy
homeowners. 146
As a result, while the Section 8 program has contributed
positively to poverty de-concentration on the margins, it has failed
to induce systematic change over its more than thirty years in
existence. While fewer Section 8 recipients live in high poverty
neighborhoods than impoverished non-recipients (including
inhabitants of subsidized low-income developments), they are still
disproportionately represented in high poverty neighborhoods. 147
Indeed, the great success story of Section 8 was the relocation of
poor families to the Chicago suburbs following the Gautreaux v.
Chicago Housing Authority lawsuit; yet this program de-concentrated
only 7,100 households over the course of twenty years. 148 This is less
than half of one percent of the nearly 2 million households that
currently receive Section 8 assistance.
Additionally, even if Section 8 recipients express more
satisfaction with their relocation than recipients of project-based
subsidies, their relocation is far from perfect. Section 8 was one of
the major programs tracked by the MTO program, and, as discussed
in Section III.D., the recipients failed to demonstrate improvements
along most of the dimensions tracked. As also discussed in that
section, one of the explanations for these results may be the short
time-horizon of the study. But it also reflects the fact that Section 8
has brought about only the piecemeal relocation of families, not
systematic poverty de-concentration. This not only is problematic
for the majority of residents who remain in impoverished
145. U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, FY 2010 Budget: Roadmap
for Transformation 10, available at http://www.hud.gov/budgetsummary2010/fy10
budget.pdf.
146. See Congressional Tax Expenditure Data, supra note 54 and accompanying text.
147. See Ellickson, supra n.10, at 1011; Kling et al., supra note 76, at 87-8 (discussing
the challenges of Section 8 relocation revealed by the MTO).
148. The Gatreaux case involved a lawsuit against the Chicago Housing Authority
alleging that they had placed public housing in a discriminatory manner. As part of the
remedy, the court ordered the Housing Authority to use Section 8 vouchers for public
housing residents' relocation. See GOETZ, supra note 11, at 52-3 (describing how Gatreaux
was the most successful use of Section 8 for deconcentration); Schuck, supra note 12, at
319-23 (details of the litigation and consent decree).
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neighborhoods; it also, as discussed in Section III.D., may undermine
the benefits of relocation for those who do move.
Section 8 vouchers have several additional shortcomings. First,
while the market-based approach of Section 8 eliminates some of the
shortcomings of project-based subsidies, one risk of the approach is
that the benefits of the subsidy will be passed on to landlords
through higher rents. Empirical studies, however, suggest that this
effect is minimal and that low-income renters do, indeed, capture
most of the program's benefits.1 49
More significantly, Section 8, like project-based subsidies, only
provides low-income households with rental assistance and thus
fails to address one of the phenomena at the core of concentrated
poverty's causes and detrimental consequences: the government's
heavy subsidization of homeownership. It is true that even without
homeownership, poor families can capture some of the positive
benefits of residential integration and poverty de-concentration
(education, job availability, lower crime rates, etc.). And this, in
turn, can help them accumulate capital to become a homeowner. But
given the government's massive subsidization of homeownership and the huge head start on wealth accumulation this provides to
those who are already homeowners - it is hard to imagine any
holistic solution to concentrated poverty that exclusively addresses
renting.
This brings us to the second set of demand-side subsidies: those
targeted at low-income homeowners rather than renters. The federal
government has two such programs, in particular: the Community
Reinvestment Act, which requires banks to meet certain lending
thresholds in low-income areas, and the Federal Housing Enterprise
Financial Safety and Soundness Act (generally referred to as the GSE
Act, or the GSEA), which requires federal mortgage insurers Fannie
May and Freddie Mac to guarantee a certain number of loans in lowincome areas.150 While the GSEA serves primarily to crowd out
private mortgage insurers and thus has essentially no impact on
lending or homeownership rates in poor neighborhoods, studies
suggest that the CRA has had a tangible, if small, positive impact on
homeownership rates in poor communities.15
Given that the government is going to subsidize
homeownership, it is a positive development on the margins that
149. GLAESER & GYOURKO, supra note 10, at 116-17.

150. Stuart A. Gabriel & Stuart S. Rosenthal, Government-Sponsored Enterprises, the
Community Reinvestment Act, and Home Ownership in Targeted Undeserved Neighborhoods,in
HOUSING MARKETS AND THE ECONOMY, supra note 110, at 202, 202-10.

151. Id. at 224-25.
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homeownership is available in poorer as well as wealthier
neighborhoods. Nevertheless, the CRA does little to de-concentrate
poverty, and in fact does not even fully alleviate its negative effects
related to homeownership. As discussed in Section II.C., the taxpreferential treatment of homeownership is regressive and
disproportionately benefits the wealthiest homeowners. This means
that a homeownership boost in a poor neighborhood provides a
smaller subsidy to poor families than a homeownership boost in a
wealthy neighborhood provides to wealthy families. Moreover, the
homeownership subsidy not only provides immediate benefits to
wealthy homeowners, but also provides incentives for them to
further boost their property values by excluding poorer residents
from their neighborhoods, which they are able to do through landuse regulations and other measures. The CRA does nothing to
address this phenomenon. Indeed, if anything, by targeting lowincome neighborhoods rather than low-income families wherever
they live, the CRA provides additional incentives for low-income
homebuyers to continue living in poorer neighborhoods, enhancing
concentrated poverty and its deleterious effects.
Thus, like Section 8 vouchers, the CRA may have certain
positive benefits to poor families on the margins. But also like
Section 8 vouchers, it is a far cry from a systematic program to
alleviate concentrated poverty and residential segregation.
C. Inclusionary Zoning
The final category of policies to combat concentrated poverty is
inclusionary zoning. Rather than subsidizing the supply or the
demand side of the housing market, inclusionary zoning instead
takes a regulatory approach, mandating that municipalities dedicate
a certain percentage of all future developments to affordable
housing projects. The specific details of the programs vary by state
and locality, but they generally require that anywhere from 5% to
35% of new developments be sold or rented at price-controlled rates.
These price-controlled developments generally must be of similar
size and quality to market-rate units and must be spread throughout
designated areas to preclude the creation of new pockets of
concentrated poverty. 5 2
Inclusionary zoning originated in the 1970s and has been
adopted with particular frequency in the last two decades. 53 The
policy is appealing at first blush because it is straightforward in
152. Benjamin Powell & Edward P. Stringham, Inclusionary Zoning, in HOUSING
AMERICA, supra note 15, at 109, 109.

153. Id. at 110.
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design and, its supporters argue, it can produce affordable housing
without direct public subsidies. 154 But this argument overlooks the
fact that funding for affordable housing has to come from
somewhere. If developers are forced to build a certain number of
nonsubsidized unprofitable developments for every profitable
development, they will require an even greater margin on those
profitable developments. Thus, inclusionary zoning ordinances can
be expected to substantially raise prices for market-rate housing.
And if market-rate renters and buyers are unwilling to pay these
higher prices, developers will simply not construct any new housing
at all, market-rate or affordable.s55
These consequences of inclusionary zoning ordinances are
borne out in empirical data. In the San Francisco Bay Area, for
instance, inclusionary zoning ordinances raised the prices of marketrate homes by an average of roughly $45,000. In some cities prices
per home increased by as much as $200,000. Similarly, in Los
Angeles and Orange Counties, the median increase in market-unit
prices from inclusionary zoning was $66,000, with increases as high
as $500,000 per unit in some wealthier suburbs.15 6 The town of
Watsonville, CA imposed particularly stringent inclusionary zoning
requirements in 1990, requiring that 25% of all new homes be sold to
low- and moderate-income buyers at below-market prices. Almost
no new construction of any kind occurred until ten years later, when
the ordinances were made less restrictive. San Jose had a similar
construction boom when the city offered a two-year exemption on its
20% affordability requirement for new developments. 5 7 And in
suburban Boston, only one-fifth of communities with inclusionary
zoning programs have reported the construction of any affordable
housing units.158
It appears, then, that inclusionary zoning is not a viable strategy
for poverty de-concentration. When ordinances aggressively set
affordable housing mandates, no new development occurs. When
thresholds are less ambitious, ordinances may prompt small levels of
affordable housing construction. But this comes at the cost of
increased prices for market-rate housing, making the neighborhood
even less affordable for all but the few families who lottery into the
affordable housing. Moreover, these price increases occur on top of
154. Jenny Schuetz, Rachel Meltzer, & Vicki Been, 31 Flavors of Inclusionary Zoning:
Comparing Policies from San Francisco, Washington, DC, and Suburban Boston, 75 J. AM
PLANNING Ass'N, 441, 442 (2009).

155. Powell & Stringham, supra note 153, at 111-14.
156. Id. at 116.
157. Id. at 118-19.
158. Schuetz et al., supra note 155, at 452.
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the already inflated prices brought about by exclusionary zoning
and other land use policies, which inclusionary zoning does not
invalidate. Thus, while inclusionary zoning may facilitate token
relocations of low-income families into wealthy neighborhoods, it
creates new obstacles to residential integration more generally. Its
net effect on concentrated poverty may not only be neutral, but
Indeed, Dartmouth Professor William Fischel has
negative.
hypothesized that the real reason municipalities adopt inclusionary
zoning is as a public relations and legal cover to fend off efforts that
actually seek to promote systematic integration.159
Finally, even the families who do move into inclusionary
zoning-mandated affordable housing are not able to capture the full
benefits of integration. Inclusionary zoning ordinances impose
resale price controls on the owners of affordable units in order to
preclude them from immediately flipping the homes for "windfall"
profits. 160 The problem with these restrictions is that they reduce the
value of the home and eliminate incentives for the owner to
maintain and improve it, which in turn further devalues the
property. 161 This precludes the low-income homeowner's ability to
accumulate wealth through homeownership, one of the core benefits
of living in a wealthier neighborhood in the first place.
D. Tying it Together
Over the past several decades the government has pursued a
multitude of subsidies and regulations designed to compel
residential integration and poverty de-concentration. All the while,
the government's own tax, land use, and education policies that
poverty remain
African-American
entrenched concentrated
unabated. Against this backdrop, some of the attempts to compel
de-concentration have been beneficial on the margins, while others
have been inconsequential if not actively detrimental. But they all
share one common feature - they have failed, over the course of
several decades, to induce any systematic progress because at the
end of the day they do not address concentrated poverty's
underlying causes. They address a problem that is perpetuated by
government interventions not by ending those interventions, but by
adding more interventions on top of them: community development
grants implemented by the level of government with the least
interest in integration; subsidies for low-income renters dwarfed by
159. WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMICS OF ZONING LAWS: A PROPERTY RIGHTS
APPROACH TO AMERICAN LAND USE CONTROLS 328 (1985).

160. Powell & Stringham, supra note 153, at 121; Schuetz et al., supra note 155, at 448.
161. Powell & Stringham, supra note 153, at 121-23.
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subsidies to wealthy homeowners; inclusionary zoning on top of
exclusionary zoning. The list goes on.
There have been some half-hearted attempts to address the
underlying drivers of perpetuated concentrated poverty. In the
celebrated 1975 case of Southern Burlington County NAACP v.
Township of Mount Laurel, for instance, the New Jersey Supreme
Court held that New Jersey's existing zoning practices violated the
state constitution's provision that police powers be used to promote
the "general welfare." 162 Rather than invalidate these zoning
practices, however, the court instead issued a remedy involving a
combination of inclusionary zoning mandates and affordable
housing subsidies. 163 As with most other uses of these policies, the
net impact has been minimal.164
Ultimately, if the United States is serious about alleviating
concentrated African-American poverty, the current policy
framework of attempting to compel integration through government
intervention will not work. Rather, we must fundamentally rethink
the overall structure of our approach towards homeownership, landuse, and urban planning. The final section of this paper will lay out
several recommendations for how to effectively do this.

IV. Law and Policy Recommendations
A. The Case Against Localism
In the last few decades, it has become increasingly trendy in
legal and academic circles to support the enhanced autonomy of
local governments. The delegation of services and decision-making
to local authorities, the argument goes, allows municipalities to
tailor their laws and policies to the particular needs of community
members while also allowing individuals and families to choose
among communities. This results in an efficient "package" of
governance for the residents of each community and encourages
democratic experimentation and innovation.165
162. S. Burlington county NAACP v. Mt. Laurel, 336 A.2d 713 (N.J. 1975), appeal
dismissed and cert. denied, 423 U.S. 808 (1975).
163. See Fischel, THE ECONOMICS OF ZONING LAWS, supra note 160, at 322-23; Schuck,

supra note 12, at 310-19.
164. Id.
165. See, e.g., Erin Ryan, Federalism and the Tug of War Within: Seeking Checks and
Balances in the InterjurisdictionalGrey Area, 66 MD. L. REV. 503, 610-20 (2007); David J.
Barron, A Localist Critique of the New Federalism, 51 DUKE L.J. 377, 377, 382 (2001); David
A. Super, Rethinking Fiscal Federalism, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2544, 2603-04 (2005); Yishai
Blank, Spheres of Citizenship, 8 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES IN LAW 411, 422 (2007); Frank B.

Cross, The Folly of Federalism24 CARDOZO L. REV. 1, 34 (2002).
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This perspective is also present in the jurisprudence of the
Rehnquist and Roberts Courts, which have worked to limit the
power of the federal government on the grounds that a
"decentralized government ... will be more sensitive to the diverse
needs of a heterogeneous society." 166 While the Supreme Court's
jurisprudence nominally restricts the power of the federal
government only vis a vis state governments, the Court "has often (if
unreflectively) treated local institutions as undifferentiated stand-ins
for the state."167
The problem with giving local governments too much
autonomy, however, is that many local laws and policies impact
individuals outside the local polity that creates them. This is
particularly relevant for zoning laws, building codes, and other
housing and land-use regulations, which artificially restrict the
ability of new families to enter a community. One of the alleged
benefits of local autonomy is that localities will compete to attract
residents, promoting democratic innovation and allowing families to
pick the package of government that best suits their needs.s68 But
zoning ordinances and building codes have the exact opposite effect,
precluding outsiders from taking advantage of a community's
desirable features so that current residents can benefit from them
disproportionately.
Land use regulations certainly have some valuable uses, but in
order to limit their exclusionary impact, their use should be limited
in two important ways. First, zoning decisions should be made at
the state level, not at the level of municipalities or even counties.169
This way, the officials making zoning decisions will be responsible
to all constituents who will be impacted by the laws, not merely a
subset. Second, and more importantly, Congress should authorize
federal courts to invalidate any zoning ordinance that, in a
substantial way, disproportionately excludes racial groups or
The Supreme Court has
members of a socioeconomic class.
repeatedly held that such ordinances cannot be invalidated under
the equal protection clause of the Constitution. But Congress could
plausibly invalidate them under the interstate commerce clause,170 or
166. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991).
167. Heather K. Gerken, Foreward:Federalism All the Way Down 124 HARV. L. REV. 1,
21 (2010).
168. See sources cited supra,note 165.
169. The Westchester litigation shows that even county authorities with diverse
populations may be overly subservient to their wealthiest constituents.
170. Under the Interstate Commerce Clause, Congress may regulate any activity
that has a "substantial relationship" to interstate commerce. United States v. Darby, 312
U.S. 100 (1941). As part of assessing whether an activity has a substantial relationship to
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under its equal protection enforcement power. 171 Indeed, in the
context of employment and voting, Congress has already enacted
laws banning policies with disparate racial impacts, even if they are
not racially motivated. 172
Banning exclusionary zoning would not only go a long way
towards alleviating concentrated African-American poverty; the
decision would have few countervailing negative effects. Most of
the basic functions of zoning that are actually useful - such as
separating residential, commercial, and industrial uses of space would, if properly designed, not be invalidated by the exclusionary
zoning limits proposed above. Moreover, wealthy Americans would
still have complete control over their own property. If they really
wanted, they could even buy up surrounding space to create a buffer
between themselves and less well-off residents with less
aesthetically pleasing houses.
In addition to zoning and other housing and land-use
regulations, the localization of public education funding also
presents a problematic delegation of government services. In this
case, the problem is not the externalities of local decisions so much
as the perversion of local incentives. The essence of public education
is that the government provides all Americans with a baseline of
educational opportunity irrespective of their ethnic, socioeconomic,
or geographic background. Unlike parks, public transportation, or
garbage collection, education is not a service that we want to vary in
nature based on local needs and preferences. Fostering competition
among individual schools to promote pedagogical experimentation
and innovation may be valuable.
But funding schools
proportionally to average community wealth does not incentivize
interstate commerce, Congress can apply the principles of "aggregation" (measuring the

effect of one person's activity by looking at what effect it would have if everyone did it)
and "overhang" (measuring the effect aggregated private action would have on third
parties). Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942). (local zoning plausibly has a substantial relationship to interstate commerce because, when aggregated, local zoning laws

affect third-party mobility, including potentially across states).
171. Under its equal protection enforcement power, Congress may take preventative
steps to combat discrimination, as long as they are "congruent and proportional" to an
underlying equal protection violation. City of Boume v. Flores, 51 U.S. 507 (1997). Thus,
even though the disparate racial impact of exclusionary zoning may not give a private
individual a constitutional cause of action, it could potentially serve as a basis for
prophylactic invalidation of these local laws by Congress. See Nevada Dep't Human
Resources v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721 (2003) (in acting to prevent discrimination, Congress

may sometimes regulate "a somewhat broader swath of conduct, including that which is
not itself forbidden by the Amendment's text," particularly for "difficult and intractable
problem[s]" that "justify added prophylactic measures in response.").
172. See Voting Rights Act § 2, 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (voting); Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000 (employment).
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educational innovation; it incentivizes municipalities to pass laws
unrelated to education (like exclusionary zoning ordinances) whose
sole purpose is to maximize the school district's wealth at the
expense of other school districts.
Banning exclusionary zoning would, of course, go a long way
towards minimizing municipalities' ability to act on these incentives.
But a correlation between public school quality and wealth is hardly
a particularly desirable outcome in the first place. Given the role
that the localization of school funding plays in incentivizing
wealthier localities to perpetuate residential segregation and poverty
concentration, states would be wise to eliminate this aspect of their
public education systems.173
B. The Proper Role for Government
Given the role local autonomy has played in perpetuating
concentrated African-American poverty, it is tempting to look to the
federal government to solve the problem. Before doing so, it is
worth bearing in mind that federal interventions in the housing
market over the last eighty years have ranged from ineffective to
disastrous. In the 1930s, 1940s, and 1950s, the federal government
played a crucial role in creating concentrated African-American
poverty through the racist practices of the FHA and HOLC. The
public housing movement of the 1960s and 1970s was better
intentioned, but no less harmful. And even today, the federal
government's net role in the housing market is to entrench
concentrated poverty. Whatever one thinks of HUD's plethora of
housing subsidy programs for the poor (and as Section IV of this
paper discussed, there are strong reasons to doubt the efficacy of
many), they are dwarfed in magnitude by the federal tax code's
subsidization of homeownership for the wealthy.
The truth is that concentrated African-American poverty was in
large part created and perpetuated by government interventions at
both the federal and local level. To the extent that federal action is
necessary to restrain harmful action by localities, such as by limiting
localities' zoning power in the manner proposed in this paper, it
should act. But before rushing to declare that new government
interventions are needed to help inner-city African Americans, we
should give housing markets a chance to operate without the
Policymakers and
detrimental regulations already in place.
173. Some states that have reduced financing disparities between school districts
still have high levels of concentrated African-American poverty. But this is to be
expected given that all of the other drivers of concentrated African-American poverty
remain in place.
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advocates truly concerned with combating concentrated AfricanAmerican poverty would best spend their energies trying to
eliminate, for instance, the home-mortgage interest deduction, rather
than trying to conjure up even more varieties of affordable housing
programs.
Even if the pernicious interventions of federal and local
governments are lifted, it will be unrealistic to expect rapid deconcentration of poverty. The cycle of inner-city poverty - poverty
concentration exacerbating poverty and thereby making it even
more difficult for residents of poor neighborhoods to move - has
operated for generations. It will be important to give markets time
to undo this cycle and to avoid the temptation to give in to quick-fix
government interventions that are likely to backfire as so many have
in the past.
That said, given that the deck has been stacked against them for
so long, it may be appropriate to give the residents of impoverished
neighborhoods some form of boost as they enter an unregulated
housing market. Tenant-based subsidies such as the Section 8
voucher program or a modified version of the CRA that targets poor
families rather than poor communities seem like the best options.
These programs are scalable, comparatively easy to administer,
provide money directly to the families who need it, and do not take
away from them the market benefits of choice and exit. Project-based
subsidies are a far inferior alternative given their inefficiencies,
inability to scale, and heavy reliance on localities for implementtation. And inclusionary zoning ordinances provide the worst
option, since, as discussed, they generally do more harm than good.
It is critical to remember, however, that even tenant-based
subsidies will not be successful until the exclusionary zoning
ordinances, tax subsidization of homeownership, and other
government regulations that entrench concentrated poverty are
lifted. This deregulation should be the number one objective of
anyone who wishes to combat concentrated poverty. Advocacy
organizations currently focused on promoting new interventions
would be wise to redirect their efforts and resources.
C. The Case for Anti-Subordination
The fact that it is government policies that continue to entrench
concentrated African-American poverty has implications for the
legal and constitutional treatment of race more generally. In its
equal protection jurisprudence, the Supreme Court has for several
decades been split down the middle on the question of whether
"benign" uses of racial classifications by government are
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constitutional. For the Court's "conservative" members, essentially
any use of a racial classification is invidious, and therefore
unconstitutional unless being used to directly remedy a specific
piece of past de jure segregation. For the Court's "liberal" members,
racial classifications that seek to promote racial equality are not
invidious at all; they therefore may be used, within reason, to
remedy more general lingering impacts of historical racial
discrimination. These are sometimes referred to as the "anticlassification" and "anti-subordination" understandings of the equal
protection clause, respectively. 174
Underlying the majority's anti-classification jurisprudence is the
assumption that, forty years after the civil rights movement
outlawed intentional racial discrimination, general racial inequalities
cannot be directly attributed to government actions. For instance, in
the case of Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School
District No. 1,175 Seattle engaged in a plan to desegregate its public
schools by assigning, on the basis of race, certain students to schools
outside their geographic school district. To Chief Justice Roberts,
this was an act of invidious "racial balancing" that could not be
justified because the schools' initial segregation was a consequence
of naturally occurring "housing patterns," not the policies of the
schools themselves. The Chief Justice famously quipped, "The best
way to stop discrimination based on race is to stop discriminating
based on race." 176
However, as this paper has discussed, racial segregation of
neighborhoods is not simply a consequence of natural "housing
patterns," but rather is directly traceable to government policies: the
racially discriminatory policies that helped create segregation and
the ongoing land use regulations, tax subsidies, and other
regulations that entrench it. As the dissenting justices in Parents
Involved argued, the Constitution may not impose an affirmative
duty to desegregate such school districts, but it certainly should not
prevent a district from doing so if it wishes.
As with many equal protection decisions, the swing vote in
Parents Involved belonged to Justice Kennedy, who sided with Justice
Roberts in the final decision, but did not sign on to his full opinion.
Justice Kennedy wrote instead that "parts of the opinion by the Chief
Justice imply an all-too-unyielding insistence that race cannot be a
factor in instances when, in my view, it may be taken into
174. A nice illustration of these fault lines is Adarand v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995)
175. Parents Involved in Cmty Sch. v. Seattle Sch, Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701 (2007)
176. Id. at 748.
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account." 77 Justice Kennedy, and the other members of the Court,
would be wise going forward to give more deference to racial
considerations intended to remedy the inequities of past racism,
particularly given that it is the government's own economic
regulation that entrenches these inequities.
Much of this paper has focused on the economic elements of
concentrated African-American poverty. The reason for this is that
the perpetuation of concentrated poverty since the civil rights
movement has been primarily an economic rather than racial
phenomenon, and the efforts of advocacy organizations working to
combat this inequality have been largely misdirected. But it is
important not to lose sight of the fact that a hugely disproportionate
number of the residents of impoverished urban neighborhoods are
African American, and that they disproportionately suffer for a
reason: because of the generations of private and governmental
racism that proceeded the 1960s. Just as advocacy organizations
should shift their organizational focus to the deregulatory policy
proposals recommended above, the Supreme Court must remain
cognizant of this history and give government the constitutional
flexibility necessary to alleviate all the racial inequality that it
caused.

177. Id. at 787 (Kennedy, J., concurring).

